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The question, whether animals have souls, is ambig-
uous. Itcan have a religious or a psychological meaning: 
• Do animals have (immortal) souls? 
• Do animals have inner life, i.e., do animals have 
subjective psychological experiences? 
At first I was not very happy with these alternatives, 
because both questions seemed unpromising for several 
reasons. I just want to mention two of these reasons: 
• Whether animals have immortal souls is as 
incapable of proof as is the existence of God; 
• That animals do have inner life seems to be a 
rather obvious assertion. 
Upon reflection, though, the second, psychological 
question doesn't seem so unimportant to me after all. 
Though today no one would be likely to defend the 
Cartesian position that animals are insensible robots 
explicitly, this attitude nevertheless still operates 
implicitly and subconsciously. 
Above all, with respect to animals one can observe 
a tendency to argue in a way similar to some arguments 
concerning environmental problems: as measures 
responding to the depletion of the ozone layer, the 
greenhouse effect, or increased incidence of leukemia 
near nuclear power plants are prevented by saying that 
the causes of these phenomena have not yet been proved 
sufficiently, necessary measures in favor of animals 
are similarly prevented by saying that the existence 
and extent of animal suffering have not yet been 
sufficiently established. 
This being so, the question whether animals have 
inner life (and to what extent) appears after all to be a 
question worth dealing with concretely and explicitly. 
Hence in the following I shall inquire into the question 
whether animals have conscious, subjective psycho-
logical experiences. In short: are animals conscious? 
The question, whether animals are conscious, is at 
bottom hypocritical and superfluous. It is hypocritical, 
because a large part of what we know concerning the 
human mind comes from investigations into animals 
minds: animal research forms a substantial basis of 
human psychology. Considering this fact and 
considering the further fact that in the setting of 
psychology this has been accomplished by the cruelest 
animal research, it is highly cynical to ask about animal 
consciousness. On the other hand, the question of 
animal consciousness is superfluous, because to 
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everyone who is not completely crazy, it is already clear 
that animals also have psychological experience. 
The fact that our fellow humans are similar, 
and feel similarly, to us, is evident in exactly 
the same sense as mathematical axioms are 
evident. We are not able not to believe in them. 
Karl Buhler, who to my knowledge was the 
first to call attention to these facts, spoke of 
"you-evidence." 
We have the same axiomatic certainty for 
animals' souls, as we have for supposing in our 
fellow humans the existence of a soul (which 
means the ability to experience subjectively). 
A human who truly knows a higher mammal, 
perhaps a dog or a monkey, and will not be 
satisfied that these beings experience similarly 
to himself, is psychologically abnonnal and 
belongs in a psychiatric clinic, as an impaired 
capacity for "you-evidence" makes him a public 
enemy. (Lorenz, 1980, pp. 251,254) 
Animal consciousness was already given voice to 
by David Hume (1739, quoted in Griffin, 1984, p. 2), 
who thought it a foregone conclusion: "No truth appears 
more evident, than thatbeasts are endow'd with thought 
and reason as well as men." Also according to Robert 
Spaemann (1984, p.7l) it is well-known "that at least 
more highly evolved animals can experience conditions 
which we can describe accurately only with words like 
pain, suffering, pleasure and well-being." And Adolph 
Portmann (1987, pp. 112, 116), for whom there can be 
no doubt that animals have a rich conscious life, poses 
the question: 
May one truly ask in earnest, whether animals 
have a soul-is the answer not obvious-is it 
not self evident for everyone whose heart is 
open to animals, that these creatures are 
ensouled, that they perceive and experience 
similarly as we do, that they are subject to 
moods as we are, that they exhibit attachment 
and rejection among themselves, as in 
intimacy with us humans?" (p. 108) 
Also for Charles Darwin (1874) there can be no 
doubt that between humans and higher mammals there 
is no fundamental difference regarding inner life (ch. 3): 
"The fact that the lower animals are excited by the same 
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emotions as we are is so well established, that it will 
not be necessary to weary the reader by many details." 
(p. 84) After giving examples of love, jealousy, 
ambition, pride, modesty, rage, and even of animals' 
sense of humor (p. 86f), he turns to "the more 
intellectual emotions and faculties" and describes 
wonder, curiosity, imitation, attentiveness, memory, and 
understanding of animals. (pp.87-92)1 
Without wishing to go into details, one should point 
to the biological foundation of the psychological 
similarity between humans and animals (cf. Rollin, 
1981, p. 41): 
We know with certainty for humans that 
emotional processes occur in essence in the 
brain stem and in the limbic system. This, 
however, is as highly developed in higher 
mammals as in humans.... 
Although the anatomy of bird brains is not 
directly similar to that of mammal brains, it 
would be very inept not to ascribe intensive 
mental experiences also to birds. (Lorenz, 
1980, p. 254) 
Finally, it should be remembered that the psycho-
logical similarity between humans and animals also 
follows from considerations from evolutionary theory: 
humans and animals are related; the differences between 
them are not so much a matter ofkind as they are instead 
a matter of degree, so that "the senses and intuitions, 
the various faculties ... of which man boasts, may be 
found in incipient, or even sometimes in a well-
developed condition, in the lower animals." (Darwin, 
1874, p. 141; cf. Portmann, 1987, esp. pp. 110ff., 116) 
In connection with evolutionary theory, a personal 
observation: those who most vehemently claim an 
insuperable gulf between themselves and animals, are 
in truth the closest to being "animals"! 
Pain 
Pain is that psychological phenomenon which is 
most manifestly experienced by both humans and 
animals, for at least two reasons. The first is animals' 
behavior in situations which cause pain to humans. This 
behavior allows no doubt that they also experience pain. 
The second reason is that pain has a biological function 
of protecting from danger: "No higher creatures without 
pain-but without pain also no higher life: pain is that 
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warning which protects our bodies and lives." (Frey, 
1978, p. 7) (cf. also Serjeant, 1970, p. 56-62) On that 
score, it is important to establish that by no means do 
animals feel pain to a lesser degree than humans do. 
Rather consider: 
All known/acts support the assertion that the 
higher mammals experience pain at least as 
strongly as we do. It is nonsensical to say that 
they experience it less because they are lower 
animals. One can easily show that the senses 
of animals are much sharper than ours. Birds 
often see better, nearly all free living animals 
hear better, others have a more sensitive sense 
of touch than we do. The sharp perception of 
a hostile environment is of more vital 
importance for higher animals that it is for 
contemporary humans. Apart from the 
complicated cortex which does not perceive 
pain directly, the nervous systems ofthe higher 
animals are nearly identical with ours. 
(Serjeant, 1970, p. 99ff. emphasis added) 
Next to the above mentioned physiological aspects 
there are, however, also still psychological grounds which 
suggest that in certain circumstances animals feel pain 
even more intensely than humans. Bernard Rollin (1981, 
p. 33) points out the possibility that animals in pain 
experience only pain, without the possibility of 
anticipating an end to the pain, so that their entire 
psychological horizon is filled with pain. And Bernhard 
Grzimek (quoted in Teutsch, 1987, p. 264) writes in 
reference to animals: "Their pains are much more horrible 
than ours, for they must suffer them blind and dumb, they 
know not why or what for. They have no comfort." Also 
RobertSpaemann (1979, quoted in Teutsch, 1987, p. 264) 
has himself stated about this issue: "On the one hand, 
reason can increase pain because it accumulates past and 
future pain, so to speak. On the other hand, however, 
reason gives us the ability to dissociate from and overcome 
pain. To sing psalms on the way into the gas chambers-
that no animal can do. They are delivered speechless, in 
dumb fear, and their fear is nearly always fear of death." 
Otfried Hoffe (1984, p. 85ff., quoted in Teutsch, 1987, 
p. 264) has also attended to the details of this issue: 
Now one could object that the distinguishing 
feature of humans and animals, the ability to 
reflect, entails a new relation to pain, especially 
Between the Species 
a higher degree of pain. It is correct that the 
relation to pain changes, but false that pain 
in principle increases. The ability to reflect 
also allows us to foresee an end of pain, or-
as in the case of a painful cure-to recognize 
its necessity, which allows us to endure more 
easily. Beyond this, only humans can ask 
themselves the question of the sense of life, 
leading to despair over an apparently 
meaningless life, but also being able to 
accept one's life and digesting it creatively. 
In a word: however much the relation to pain 
changes with the capacity for reflection, this 
provides no argument for having less regard 
for the pain of subhuman creatures than for 
the pain of humans. 
As evident and certain as is the capacity to 
experience pain among the higher animals, so it is 
probable, on the other hand, that the further we descend 
on the evolutionary scale, we end finally somewhere in 
reflexive, mechanical reactions. We will not here 
discuss the problem of line-drawing, which is much 
more a theoretical than a practical concern, but will later 
discuss it. Mention should be made in this connection 
of the very serious clues that worms and insects are 
also clearly capable of pain. (see Rollin, 1981, p. 3lff.; 
Lockwood, 1988: and Griffin, 1984, pp. 179-195). 
Suffering 
However, animals experience not only physical 
pain, but also psychological suffering: the pain of 
separation, homesickness, grief, despair, hopelessness, 
dread, anger. (Bilz, 1974, V, 28; Serjeant, 1970, p. 
100) That animals also suffer mentally is not just the 
personal opinion or invention of sentimental animal 
lovers, but an indisputable reality. The best evidence 
of this is that professional animal exploiters who work 
solely for the "optimal" exploitation of food animals 
confirm it. So, for example, M. Cena (1978) in his 
contribution to an anthology on "Farm Animal 
Production," speaks explicitly ofdepression, neuroses, 
psychoses, nervousness, and stress of animals. 
What has already been mentioned in reference to 
physical pain must also be pointed out with respect to 
psychological suffering, that under certain circum-
stances animals will suffer more than similarly situated 
humans. For example, if humans are captured in war, 
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we can explain to them that they will be searched and 
locked up, but that in the meantime nothing else will 
happen to them and that they will be freed later. But if 
we capture a wild animal, we cannot communicate to it 
that we will not kill it. It cannot distinguish between 
an attempt to overcome it and an attempt to kill it, and 
thus much the same fright is produced in both situations. 
(Singer, 1984, p. 76, and 1982, p. 36) Also, Robert 
Spaemann (1984, p. 78) has stated: "Just because 
animals cannot integrate their suffering into a higher 
identity of an intentional life connection, and so master 
it, they are delivered to their suffering. They are, so to 
speak, in pain, only pain, before all, if they cannot react 
through flight or aggression." 
Intelligence 
Following the previous theoretical explanations of 
animal consciousness, we will now tum our attention 
to some examples of animal behavior. Although these 
examples are not a proof in the strongest sense of the 
existence of animal consciousness-such a proof is 
not possible even in the case of the existence of 
consciousness in our fellow humans; we will return to 
this topic later-nevertheless (especially in connection 
with theoretical considerations) they make animal 
consciousness so plausible and probable that serious 
doubts are not possible. We tum next to examples of 
animal intelligence. 
Darwin (1874, p. 85) reports the following occurrence: 
At the Cape of Good Hope an officer had often 
plagued a certain baboon, and the animal 
seeing him approaching one Sunday for 
parade, poured water into a hole and hastily 
made some thick mud, which he skillfully 
dashed over the officer as he passed by, to the 
amusement of many bystanders. For long 
afterward the baboon rejoiced and triumphed 
whenever he saw his victim. 
Vitus Droscher (1987b) reports the following 
"performance": 
A young Canadian beaver performed a real 
prank. Each morning at the same time with 
its parents, relatives and older siblings it would 
forage from a farmer's wife. There the four-
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legged hooligan wanted the daintiest morsel, 
always appearing first at the food place. 
One day, however, he had wasted time, and 
as he sprang out of the water, all the adults 
and older beavers were already pressing at the 
trough. He ran back to the river and hastily 
slapped the water three times with his wide 
tail. In beaver language that is the alarm signal 
for the highest danger. In a flash all the other 
beavers vanished, and the young rascal had 
the food all to himself... 
Consider what pertains to the performance 
of this little beaver: he had to give the alarm 
and fright signal, without having a real fright 
of a predator. Hence he had to free himself 
from the chains of instinctive behavior and act 
intentionally. He succeeded only through an 
act of self-reflection: he had to know how his 
act would affect others to deceive them. 
Concerning a rhesus monkey in New York's Bronx Zoo, 
Droscher reports: 
One day a shrewd fellow was missing from 
the large monkey rock, and it took a few days 
before someone found and captured him. The 
enclosure, the moat, and everything else was 
examined. Nowhere was a possible escape 
route discovered. But the next day the deserter 
was gone again. 
Once again, a police contingent set about 
trapping the animal. And then a keeper laid in 
wait to discover the monkey's secret escape 
path. At daybreak he finally saw the animal 
take a banana from a hiding place. This 
charitable visitor's gift had been reserved 
especially for his escape plan. He ran with it 
to the broad moat, which bordered the moose 
enclosure, and swung the banana visibly back 
and forth-just like a scientist, who wished to 
artfully lure some experimental animal with a 
food reward. 
In fact, a large moose swam over to the 
rhesus monkey. Quickly putting the banana in 
his mouth as a ticket, so to speak, the cunning 
and water-shy fellow sprang onto the moose's 
broad back and allowed the "boat" to ferry him 
to the neighboring enclosure. From here the 
escape was only monkey-child's play. (p. l00ff.) 
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Finally, a story which Droscher reports concerning 
baboons: 
In a free enclosure of a zoo the strongest male 
ascended to sultan, and forbade the rest of the 
males to have intimate relations with his 
"ladies." He endured not even the slightest 
flirt. Still, he couldn't always stand guard. If 
he removed anywhere to the shadows of the 
rock to nap, it could happen that the ladies 
would two-time with other males. A harem 
female who had been neglected by the sultan 
for a long time, began in such an opportunity 
to openly display all her charms in order to 
befriend a bachelor. 
At just that moment the sultan reappeared, 
and something incredible happened: as if 
threatened with murder, the cheater cried out, 
scrambled loose, gave the still courting male 
a slap, moaning loudly fled into the arms of 
the bewildered sultan, and complained to him, 
looking across at her seducer raging loudly and 
angrily with her arms beating the ground. And 
she achieved her goal: the sultan, who for 
forbidden intimacy usually only punished the 
female, believed this crafty lie. First he 
thrashed the blameless bachelor suitably, and 
then he overwhelmed the "certified sufferer" 
with affection. (p. lOlff.)2 
Social Life 
All higher animals demonstrate individuality 
in behavior, choice, aversion, and preference 
within social life. In mates which come 
together to reproduce we see very intimate 
relations, which are preserved beyond all 
sexual necessity, and similar relations can be 
observed between animal parents and their 
children. All zoos know how the welfare of 
their wards depends on the effectiveness of 
such relations. (portmann, 1987, p. 115) 
Concerning the mother-child relation among 
dolphins, John Robbins (1987, p. 39) reports the 
following: if dolphin children fall into tuna nets, their 
mother will follow them for endless stretches, trying to 
accompany the children as far as possible. If mother 
and child are caught together in the nets, the mother 
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will stay as near as possible to the children, to sing to 
them. The tuna fish industry takes note of this only 
insofar as it has noted that the majority ofdolphins found 
in their nets are female or young. In this way, about 
150,000 come to die each year. (O'Barry, 1989, p.18ff.) 
Also in the social life of animals we find types of 
behavior which it would be absurd not to accept as 
connected with subjective experience. The basis for 
animal social life, as with humans, is the ability to give 
love, the desire to receive love, and the suffering which 
results from deprivation of loved ones. (See Robbins, 
1987, pp. 37-39) 
The most impressive proof of animal social life 
occurring on the level of subjective experience is 
doubtless the emotional relation between mother and 
children. Disturbing or preventing these relations 
leads, as in humans, to severe, lifelong harm, even 
literally to insanity. One can in no way doubt this 
conclusion, which grew out of decades of intensive 
scientific research. The dreadful experiments on 
monkeys which the American psychologist Harry 
Harlow carried out are only the best known in this 
area of research, in which animals are systematically 
and intentionally caused the most severe mental 
suffering, in order to achieve new scientific knowledge 
concerning humans. Thus Harlow and his colleague 
Stephen Suomi describe 
how they had the "fascinating idea" of 
inducing depression by "allowing baby 
monkeys to attach to cloth surrogate mothers 
who could become monsters": 
"The first of these monsters was a cloth 
monkey mother who, upon schedule or demand, 
would eject high-pressure compressed air. It 
would blow the animal's skin practically off its 
body. What did the baby monkey do? It simply 
clung tighter and tighter to the mother, because 
a frightened infant clings to its mother at all 
costs. We did not achieve any psychopathology. 
"However, we did not give up. We built 
another surrogate monster mother that would 
rock so violently that the baby's head and teeth 
would rattle. All the baby did was cling tighter 
and tighter to the surrogate. The third monster 
we built had an embedded wire frame within 
its body which would spring forward and 
eject the infant from its ventral surface. The 
infant would subsequently pick itself off the 
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floor, wait for the frame to return into the attacked by three sharks. Immediately, he 
cloth body, and then cling again to the burst forth with a series of shrill whistles: SOS 
surrogate. Finally, we built our porcupine signals in dolphin language. The short double-
mother. On command, this mother would notes sound like an over-wound alarm siren: 
eject sharp brass spikes over all of the ventral the first part increases sharply in musical pitch, 
surface of its body. Although the infants were the second falls as harshly. 
distressed by these pointed rebuffs, they The result was amazing. The group of 
simply waited until the spikes receded and dolphins (approximately 20), chatting with 
then returned and clung to the mother." whistling, screaming, grunting, gurgling, 
These results, the experimenters remark, growling and squeaking sounds, immediately 
.were not so surprising, since the only recourse stopped their conversation. As in an 
of an injured child is to cling to its mother. emergency call in shipping, there was 
Eventually, Harlow and Suomi gave up on absolute radio silence. Then the animals shot 
the artificial monster mothers because they in greatest haste at 60 krn/hr to the area of 
found something better: a real monkey the surprise attack. The male dolphins 
mother that was a monster. To produce such rammed the sharks with undiminished speed. 
mothers, they reared female monkeys in They dealt crashing blows to their sides until 
isolation, and then tried to make them the sharks were crushed and sank to the deep 
pregnant. Unfortunately, the females did not bottom of the Caribbean Sea with broken 
have normal sexual relations with male bones and cartilage. 
monkeys, so they had to be made pregnant During the struggle, the females endeavored 
by a technique which Harlow and Suomi refer to help the disabled adolescent dolphin, who 
to as a "rape rack." When the babies were could no longer surface on his own strength. 
born the researchers observed the monkeys. Two took him between them, pushing him 
They found that some simply ignored the under his vertical fins and holding him so high 
infants, failing to cuddle the crying baby to that the blow hole on his head projected out of 
the breast as normal monkeys do when they the water and the disabled one could breathe 
hear their baby cry. The other pattern of again. By reciprocal whistling signals the 
behavior observed was different: helping maneuver was accomplished exactly. 
"The other monkeys were brutal or lethal. From time to time they would relieve the 
One of their favorite tricks was to crush the stretcher bearers. Once it was observed how 
infant's skull with their teeth. But the really this indefatigable rescue work went on 
sickening behavior pattern was that of continuously day and night for a full two weeks, 
smashing the infant's face to the floor, then until the injured dolphin was healthy and back 
rubbing it back and forth." (Singer, 1975, pp. to his original strength. (p.95ff.) 
44-45. Quotations are from Engineering and 
Science, 33, 6 (April, 1970), p. 8) A chimpanzee was seriously wounded by a 
hunting party and plunged to the ground. As 
Morally Analogous Behavior he thereupon let out a cry for help, the other 
members of the troop surrounded him, raised 
A further proof of animal consciousness, one which him up, propping him in an unbelievable 
is most closely connected to social life and overlaps human manner, and urged him with gentle 
with it, is so-called morally analogous behavior. The sounds to go with them. While this was 
following examples, in my opinion, speak for occurring, a strong ape threw himself, 
themselves. The next three reports come from Droscher screeching loudly, between the sick transport 
(1987a): and the hunters. Only when he heard through 
In the ocean area of the Lesser Antilles, an repeated shouts from his companions that they 
adolescent dolphin strayed far beyond the had found protection in a thick wood, he 
visual range of his troop, and was suddenly removed himself to safety. (p. 96) 
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Especially astonishing is the fact that 
chimpanzees do not manifest solidarity only 
with their own kind. As a Dutch researcher 
tied a chick in the path of a virgin forest, the 
robust chimpanzees also freed this chirper, 
gracefully removing the chain, and being 
certain not to injure the delicate legs of the 
small bird. (p. 97) 
James Rachels (1976, p. 215ff.) tells of a diabolical 
experiment that was conducted in the United States 
with rhesus monkeys. The details of the experiment 
should not be gone into here. It is enough to briefly 
represent the basic conception and the results of the 
experiment. Two animals would be placed in an 
experimental device, with a glass wall separating them 
in the middle. The animal on one side had the 
possibility of obtaining food by operating a lever. The 
floor of the section on the other side, where the second 
animal was, could be delivered a current, which would 
give this animal a strong and very painful electric 
shock. Now the experiment was set up in such a way 
that, every time the first animal pressed the food lever, 
the second animal would receive a strong electric 
shock. In this manner it could be established whether 
and to what degree the first animal would renounce 
food in order to spare its conspecific an electric shock. 
It appeared that a distinct majority of experimental 
animals placed in the compartment with the food lever 
preferred to go without food for days rather than to 
deliver an electric shock to the animal present on the 
other side. 
E. Gavin Reeve (1978, p. 562) reports a mongrel, 
Blackie, who had tried in vain to rescue Ian, a four-
month infant, from a burning house. Both perished 
in the flames. Although no one observed the dog's 
brave rescue aUempt direclly, clear traces were left 
behind: light impressions of his teeth on the baby's 
shoulder, from when he was trying to pull Ian from 
the fire. 
The fire broke out in the kitchen. While the mother 
hastened to her two other children, B1ackie ran into 
Ian's bedroom. The mother heard a bump which 
probably was the striking of the child, as the dog pulled 
him from his bed onto the floor. The dead child was 
found only a few centimeters from Blackie's 
outstretched paws. The dog had come to the family 
first a year previous. After the birth of Ian, he sat 
most frequently next to the child's bed. 
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Three Objections 
By now it should be clear to everyone that animals 
are not unconscious automata, but feeling creatures 
with conscious psychological experience; may I 
conclude by considering three objections which are 
frequently produced in this area: 
"There is no clear demarcation between conscious 
and unconscious creatures:' 
This objection is just as correct as it is unimportant. 
Such questions of line drawing arise everywhere in 
life, without creating serious uncertainty in our 
decisions. Between warm and cold, poor and rich, 
right and wrong there is also no clear, unequivocal 
boundary. Nevertheless, that there is no unquestioned 
line to be drawn for these conceptions gives us no great 
difficulty as a rule. We know what is meant by talk of 
warm food, rich people or wrongful activity. 
And so it is also concerning the question which 
creatures have psychological experience: no reasonable 
person would wish to seriously maintain that dogs, cats, 
apes, pigs, cows, and chickens (and all other animals 
concerning which the well known animal protection 
questions are asked) do not suffer if we poison, gas, 
burn them, place them in lifelong captivity, or brutally 
kill them. And the decisive point in connection with 
our question is not that it is uncertain where the 
boundary between conscious and unconscious creatures 
exaclly lies, but that it is certain that it does not lie 
between humans and animals. 
"We have no access to animal consciousness. 
because animals cannot speak." 
Obviously, language is of enormous importance in 
human life. And it would be absurd to put into question 
the towering role that language has for the entirety of 
human evolution and culture. However, in concrete 
interpersonal communication, verbal language is 
neither the sole, nor always the best, way of 
communicating. And therefore the impossibility of 
speaking with animals is no fundamental hindrance 
to access to animal experience. Bernard Rollin (1983, 
p. 111, and 1981, pp. 36ff., 55, 57) calls attention in 
this connection to the following facts: 
In a certain sense animal psychic life is even more 
easily accessed than is that of other humans, because 
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it is more simply structured. While human needs are 
determined socially, culturally, and historically, and 
therefore correspondingly variable in form, animal 
needs are simpler and more stable. Due to the simpler 
structure of animal psyche, there are also fewer sources 
and possibilities of deception. Nonverbal animal 
behavior is often a more reliable indicator of 
experience and desires than human speech is; animal 
lies are very infrequent. 
Also, an important part of human communication 
takes place on a nonverbal level. All lovers know that 
in the critical and decisive moments linguistic 
communication breaks down and feelings and moods 
are best brought to expression through a glance, a 
gesture, or a touch. And the earliest and most important 
human communication succeeds long before we can 
speak: namely, in the empathetic relation between 
mother and child. Here in a subtle and complex manner 
psychic experience is communicated, without the child 
being able to use a single word. This early, perfcctly 
functioning mother-child relation is the best and most 
impressive proof that communicative and cognitive 
equivalence of two creatures is not a presupposition of 
functioning communication between them. 
'The existence ofanimal consciousness cannot be 
scient(fically established." 
This objection is correct. But it holds not only 
for animal consciousness, but for all consciousness 
outside our own, which means it holds also for the 
consciousness of other humans. Their subjective 
experience is not objective or provable either, 
because our knowledge of the experience of others 
is necessarily always based on an analogical 
argument (which is certainly very probable, but never 
can conduct us to absolutely certain conclusions): 
because our fellow humans are obviously similar to 
us, and because they react similarly to us in similar 
situations, we reasonably conclude that they also 
experience similarly to us. However, ultimately, all 
subjective experience is bound to the subject, and 
we have no possibility of direct access to this 
experience. Logically, all other humans could be 
completely spiritless, thoughtless, and unconscious 
robots acting from complicated computer programs 
and a complex mechanism, which only impart the 
appearance of being humans with conscious 
psychological experience. "Pure logic cannot refute 
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solipsism-the view that I am the only conscious. 
thinking creature." (Griffin, 1984. p.39) 
We can have ultimate certainty concerning neither 
animal experience nor the experience of other humans. 
In both cases we are directed to probabilistic and 
analogical arguments. Referring to this, there are no 
relevant differences of principle between the problems 
and the possibilities of grasping animal experience, and 
the problems and possibilities of grasping human 
experience. We must in both cases use the same 
epistemological and methodological measures, and 
must not demand in regard to grasping animal 
experience a logical and methodological standard which 
in the case of humans is neither attainable nor expected 
(cf. Teutsch, 1987, p. 14; Sambraus, 1982. pp. 24-27; 
Lorenz, 1980, p. 251; Griffin, 1984. p. 38ff.): 
Many of the objections to the exploration of 
thought and feelings of animals ... seem to be 
based on a kind of species solipsism. It may 
be logically impossible to refute the assertion 
that all animals are thoughtless robots. But 
we can escape this paralyzing dilemma. if we 
rely on the same criteria of reasonable 
plausibility by which we acknowledge the 
consciousness of other humans. (Griffin, 
1984,p.39) 
That animals have consciousness is as certain as it 
is certain that other humans have consciousness. And 
whether animals have immortal souls is as uncertain 
as it is uncertain whether humans have immortal souls. 
The question whether animals have immortal souls 
is, however, not only factually uncertain, but also 
morally unimportant. In any case, no support can be 
found for the assumption that, should animals lack 
immortal souls, we may therefore treat them worse. 
(See Regan, 1987, p. 69; cr. Rollin, 1981, p. 6ff, as 
well as 1983, p. 107). 
How long a creature lives is unimportant for the 
question how we should treat it while it lives. If a dog 
has been hit by an auto and we can mitigate its pain. 
then we should do so. It would be grotesque to say: 
"We need not help him. as he will not live forever 
anyway." It is no less grotesque to say that we have 
no moral obligations to animals, because they have 
no life after death. If from this fact anything follows. 
then it is exactly the opposite: if animals only have 
this life, then we should do everything possible to 
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make the life they have as good as possible. Moreover, 
having no prospect of a life after death, they also have 
no prospect of reparation for wrongs which we cause 
them. Therefore, one could argue, as animals lack 
immortal souls, we should therefore treat them even 
better than humans who may hope for compensatory 
justice in another world! 
In conclusion, the question whether animals have 
souls or not is absolutely unfit for any polemics against 
the moral status ofanimals. That animals do have souls 
in the psychological sense we know, and whether they 
have souls in the religious sense is-at best-irrelevant. 
"Haben Tiere eine Seele?" translated by Lawry 
Finsen (University of Redlands, Redlands, CA) 
with many helpful suggestions from Helmut 
Kaplan. Wherever Kaplan quotes a text the 
original of which is in English, the original English 
has been substituted. Bibliographic references 
have been changed to reflect these sources, rather 
than their German translations. 
Endnotes 
1 May I call attention to Griffin (1984) and Regan (1984) 
as important and interesting sources concerning animal 
consciousness. Griffin supplies (in chapter 1) a list of proofs 
of animal consciousness in general and mentions also that 
there is quite a bit of evidence that insects are conscious. 
Regan provides (in chapters 1 and 2) a detailed and well-
grounded presentation from the biological, philosophical, and 
historical points of view. 
2 A rich number of further examples of lies and deception 
in apes can be found in Blick Ziiruck(1988). Concerning the 
spectacular research with apes and human language, especially 
the sign language used by the deaf and dumb (cf. Jenkins, 
1976). I will not here consider that research. since its results 
have recently been judged controversial (cf. "Affen: Lug Und 
Trug ...... 1986) and the research now is concentrating on 
characteristic communication (cf. ibid.). While the inquiries 
into language among apes especially-be it human or ape 
language-and among animals in general are very interesting, 
they have no central importance concerning the theme of 
animal consciousness, for language is by no means a 
presupposition ofconscious experience. (Cf. here also Regan, 
1987, p. 37ff.; Singer, 1984. pp. 130-133; and Rollin, 1981, 
pp.24-27). Finally, may I yet refer to two highly interesting 
sources concerning the theme of animal intelligence in 
general: Regan, 1976, p. 5ff.• likewise discussing the role of 
language, and Robbins, 1987, pp. 40-42. 
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barefoot, pregnant 
and soon to be in the kitchen 
of your captor 
you stand confined, 
designed 
to sustain your jailor 
with your precious milk 
and meaty flesh 
for you, 
sunshine is a hint of light 
through the crack 
above your head, 
wind is but a noise 
against the walls 
that surround you 
the only bee that stings 
is the syringe 
that shoots chemical nectar 
through your veins 
to sweeten your price at market 
soon, you will give birth 
to a calf 
that will be taken away 
by your executioner 
after he wipes his face 
from a feast of 
flesh and potatoes 
when your body is tired 
and can produce no more 
you will die 
at the mercy of those 
you have served so well 
never knowing that the grass 
was greener 
along the horizon 
Katherine Minott 
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